Cost Benefit Analysis of Labor Allocation and Training Schemes by Caravani, P. et al.
Cost Benefit Analysis of Labor 
Allocation and Training Schemes




Caravani, P., La Bella, A. and Paoluzzi, A. (1980) Cost Benefit Analysis of Labor Allocation and Training Schemes. IIASA 
Working Paper. WP-80-032 Copyright © 1980 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1437/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF LABOR 
ALLOCATION AND TRAINING SCHEMES 
P a o l o  C a r a v a n i  , A g o s t i n o  La B e l l a *  
and  A l b e r t o  P a o l u z z i *  
P a r c h  1980 
WP-80-32 
* 
C e n t r o  d i  S t u d i o  d e i  S i s t e m i  d i  C o n t r o l l o  
e C a l c o l o  A u t o m a t i c i ,  C o n s i g l i o  N a z i o n a l e  
d e l l e  R i c e r c h e ,  V i a  B u o n a r r o t i  1 2 ,  00185 
Rome, I t a l y .  
Working P a p e r s  are i n t e r i m  r e p o r t s  on  work o f  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  Sys t ems  A n a l y s i s  
and  have  r e c e i v e d  o n l y  l i m i t e d  review. V i e w s  or 
o p i n i o n s  e x p r e s s e d  h e r e i n  d o  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e p r e -  
s e n t  t h o s e  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o r  o f  i t s  N a t i o n a l  Member 
O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg ,  A u s t r i a  
PREFACE 
Discrepancies in local labor markets occur as unsatisfactory 
matching of skill within the same region as well as redundant 
supply and insatiated demand among regions. Some of this discre- 
pancy could--in principle--be removed by letting supply in one 
region meet demand in another. A reallocation policy of this 
kind poses a few questions of prominent concern: 
1. Can economic disualue arising from imperfection 
of labor markets at a regional level be mathe- 
matically assessed? 
2.- Is it possible to define a regional measure of 
inefficiency on both sides--demand and supply-- 
of the labor market? 
3. How should vacancies be distributed over skill 
and space to alleviate inefficiency? 
These questions are investigated in this paper and a short- 
run solution is obtained via the primal-dual linear programming 
formulation of the problem. 
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF LABOR 
ALLOCATION AND T R A I N I N G  SCHEMES 
P a o l o  C a r a v a n i ,  A g o s t i n o  La B e l l a  
and  A l b e r t o  P a o l u z z i  
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
~ u c h  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e  o v e r  e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  i n v o l v e s  a  r e v i s e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  s o c i a l  s o u r c e s  
o f  p r o f i t  [ 1 , 2 , 3 ] .  I n e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n s  o f t e n  r e s u l t  i n  so -  
c a l l e d  e x t e r n a l  d i s e c o n o m i e s  such  a s  e c o l o g i c a l  damage, t r a n s -  
p o r t a t i o n  c o n g e s t i o n ,  communicat ion c o s t s  and  t h e  l i k e .  I f  t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  are bound t o  p l a y  a dominant  r o l e  i n  p r o f i t  f o r m a t i o n  and  
g rowth ,  i t  a p p e a r s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t h a t  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  s h o u l d  b e  
e x p l i c i t l y  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  economic a n a l y s i s .  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  w e  a d d r e s s  o u r s e l v e s  t o  i n e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a -  
t i o n s  o f  j o b s  t o  v a c a n c i e s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  a  r e g i o n a l  l a b o r  m a r k e t .  
A s  it  h a s  been  o b s e r v e d  by s e v e r a l  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  [ 4 , 5 , 6 ]  
t h e r e  e x i s t  s t r u c t u r a l  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  be tween  l a b o r  demand and  
s u p p l y  a t  a l o c a l  l e v e l ,  even  i n  p r e s e n c e  o f  a n  e x c e s s  l a b o r  
s u p p l y  a t  a  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  T h i s  f e a t u r e  h a s  l e d  t o  t h e  i n t r o -  
d u c t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  t h e o r i e s ,  sometimes r e - e n f o r c i n g  e a c h  o t h e r ,  
i n  some c a s e  o v e r l a p p i n g ,  o f t e n  i n  s h a r p  a n t a g o n i s m .  
N e o c l a s s i c a l  Theory p o s t u l a t e s  a n  a u t o m a t i c  s a t u r a t i o n  o f  
l a b o r  m a r k e t  s u s t a i n e d  by  wage rate  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
m a r g i n a l  l a b o r  p r o d u c t .  Thus ,  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  i s  m e t  by l o w e r ,  
e x c e s s  demand by h i g h e r  wages.  However a  c l o s e r  l o o k  i n t o  modern 
industrial infrastructure soon reveals the existance of jobs 
where qualification requirements come prior to wage levels, i.e. 
lack of skill is not always off-tradeable by lower wages on the 
management side. A similar rigidity is observable on the supply 
side. Relatively high wages but unsatisfactory working condi- 
tions (instability, environment,, shifts ets. ) may curb down 
labor supply or fail to attract labor at all. 
Recognizing this feature, some authors introduced the con- 
ceptual device of a "dual labor market". This comprises a pri- 
mary market linked to large, capital-intensive industries pro- 
viding high wages, job stability and excellent working conditions: 
a secondary market with opposite features. Within each sector, 
the laws of marginal theory still hold but communication and 
information between sectors--if present--is one-directional, 
i.e. from primary to secondary [ 4 ,  5, 6 and 7 1 .  In order for 
this theory to be workable at a regional level, it is necessary 
to assume spatial homogeneity within each market. While this 
may be true for certain advanced industrial cities, where large 
high-wage industries moved out of the city centres and small 
labor-intensive industries remained in the center, it appears 
questionable to postulate homogeneity in an integrated inter- 
regional analysis. Different regions may have very different 
development patterns and the distinction between primary and 
secondary market may lose much of its explanatory value when 
projected on a spatial dimension. 
An extension of the dual labor market concept was recently 
introduced by [8, 9 and 101 in the form of a multi-segmented 
labor market. Such a finely articulated description may well be 
warranted on a micro-scale for sociological assessment of beha- 
vioral complexity. From the standpoint of economic analysis, 
however, we see no reason to further pursue this methodological 
trend outside the attempt to recover within each segment of the 
labor market the validity of marginal theory. Unwilling to enter 
the dispute here by pledging allegiance to a new theory or a new 
definition on this sociologically inflated subject, we will 
rather assume, along with [11], a Keynesian framework of downward 
sticking wages and existence of equilibrium under partial employ- 
ment. Our purpose in this paper is to propose a method to assess 
the economic disvalue arising from imperfection of labor market 
mechanisms in combining supply and demand at a regional level. 
Discrepancies in local labor market occur as unsatisfactory 
matching of skills within the same region as well as redundant 
supply and insatiated demand among regions. It is assumed that 
each of those discrepancies can be assigned asocial disvalue in 
terms of re-training and/or commuting-migrating costs. This as- 
sumption permits to formulate the problem of allocating jobs to 
vacancies inthe short-run as the minimization of economic disvalue 
of market imperfection. This minimization problem will be transla- 
ted into the standard format of a Linear Programming Problem. The 
economic interpretation of the associated dual problem permits to 
evaluate the social cost-benefit of creating a job in a given 
region and skill, as well as the marginal value-disvalue of a new 
unemployee entering the labor market. It is hoped that the results 
of this kind of analysis will offer valuable information for an 
active regional policy both on the supply and the demand side. 
2. A TYPOLOGY OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
The main feature of our approach is to regard unemployment 
under two fundamental dimensions, skill and space. Within the 
same region labor demand and supply may not match due to skill 
discrepancies, although some of this discrepancy could be re- 
moved by letting supply in one region meet demand in another. 
This viewpoint requires, of course, a rather precise definition 
of a labor market region. Several definitions have been pro- 
posed in this regard, see for instance [2]. For our purposes 
it will be sufficient to introduce the following "closure" crite- 
rion: labor market regions are to be self-contained with respect 
to home-work commuting. On this basis it is possible to categorize 
unemployment under the five headings suggested by D. Gleave and 
D. Palmer [13] and freely re-phrased here: 
f r i c t i o n a l :  unemployed worker s  who c o u l d  be employed i n  
t h e  same l a b o r  marke t  ( r e g i o n )  and o c c u p a t i o n  ( s k i l l )  
because  t h e r e  e x i s t  s u f f i c i e n t  v a c a n c i e s ;  
s p a t i a l - s t r u c t u r a l :  unemployed w o r k s r s  who c o u l d  f i n d  
a  job  i n  -the same o c c u p a t i o n  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  l a b o r  
m a r k e t ;  
o c c u p a t i o n a l - s t r u c t u r a l :  unemployed w o r k e r s  who c o u l d  
g a i n  employment  w i t h i n t  t h e i r  r e g i o n  i f  t h e y  c o v l d  be 
r e t r a i n e d  and l e a r n  a n o t h e r  s k i l l ;  
s p a t i a l - o c c u p a t i o n a l - s t r u c t u r a l :  unempzoyed w o r k e r s  who 
would need t o  change  b o t h  r e g i o n  and o c c u p a t i o n  t o  
o b t a i n  employment ;  
demand-def ic ient :  unemployed due t o  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o v e r  
t h e  t o t a l  number o f  v a c a n c i e s .  
I n  [ I 3 1  a  p a r t i t i o n  a l g o r i t h m  i s  proposed t o  c l a s s i f y  i n  
t h e  above f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  t h e  unemployed by r e g i o n  and s k i l l .  
That  p r o c e d u r e ,  however,  s u f f e r s  from two major  shor tcomings .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o b t a i n e d  i s  dependent  on t h e  o r d e r i n g  ac-  
c o r d i n g  t o  which t h e  s i n g l e  c l a s s e s  a r e  d e f i n e d .  Secondly ,  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  c r i t e r i o n  used i n  t h e  ass ignment  of  v a c a n c i e s  t o  
unemployment seems d e v o i d  o f  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  
A t h e o r e t i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  a  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  p rocedure  
ought  t o  be sough t  under  t h e  assumption o f  r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  unemployment t o  v a c a n c i e s .  L e t  us  assume th roughou t  t h a t  
o u r  l a b o r  market  comprises  N r e g i o n s  and M s k i l l s .  Assume 
t h a t  a  s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n *  
i s  a s s i g n e d ,  where t h e  arguments  have t h e  f o l l o w i n g  meanings:  
 he t e r m  " s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n "  w i l l  be f r e e l y  used  through-  
o u t  t h e  paper  a s  a  s u r r o g a t e  t o  " o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n " ,  " p e r f o r -  
mance i n d e x " ,  " o p t i m a l i t y  c r i t e r i o n "  e t c .  Although it w i l l  
be o c c a s i o n a l l y  a b b r e v i a t e d  a s  " u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n "  w e  s t r e s s  t h a t  
no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between u t i l i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t .  
x - = {xi:} v e c t o r  o f  r e - a l l o c a t e d  unemployed. xl: i s  t h e  
number o f  unemployed i n  s k i l l  i o f  r e g i o n  r 
r e - a l l o c a t e d  i n  s k i l l  j o f  r e g i o n  s f  
- c - {crs ) c o s t - v e c t o r  a s s o c i a t e d  t o  l a b o r  movement 
( f rom r e g i o n  r t o  s )  , 
1 = { l i j }  c o s t - v e c t o r  a s s o c i a t e d  t o  r e t r a i n i n g  ( f rom s k i l l  
- 
s k i l l  i t o  j )  , 
w - = {wir} v e c t o r  o f  wage d i s t r i b u t i o n  o v e r  s k i l l s  and  
r e g i o n s ,  
A r a t i o n a l  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  unemployment t o  v a c a n c i e s  r e q u i r e s - -  
i n  p r i n c i p l e - - t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem: 
max U(x,c,&,w) , 
X 
w i t h  
D i r :  unemployment i n  s e c t o r  i and r e g i o n  r ,  
V  : v a c a n c i e s  i n  s e c t o r  j and r e g i o n  s .  js 
Remark: C o n s t r a i n t s  ( 3 )  and  ( 4 )  imply  t h a t  
C C D .  > C C V  lr - js i r j s 
i . e . ,  t o t a l  unemployment, o v e r  a l l  r e g i o n s  e x c e e d s  t o t a l  number 
o f  v a c a n c i e s .  Assuming e x i s t e n c e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a s o l u t i o n  o f  
* problem ( 2 )  - ( 4 )  t o  b e  s a t i s f i e d ,  l e t  x J S  b e  t h e  o p t i m a l  i r  
s o l u t i o n  o f  problem ( 2 ) - ( 4 ) .  Then, t h e  s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  unemployment a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  ment ioned  above 
r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s :  
f r i c t i o n a l :  {*xir} i r  
s p a t i a l - s t r u c t u r a l :  
o c c u p a t i o n a l - s t r u c t u r a l :  { * x j r )  , i r  j # i 
s p a t i a l - o c c u p a t i o n a l -  
s t r u c t u r a l :  { * X ~ ~ l  I j f i ,  s f r  ir 
demand-de f i c i en t :  
w i t h  
3 .  OPTIMAL LABOR ASSIGNMENT AND WORKPLACE LOCATION 
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  unemployment r e q u i r e s  a  p r e c i s e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  W e  w i l l  assume t h a t  s o c i a l  
u t i l i t y  i s  measured by t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  GNP made p o s s i b l e  by t h e  
r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  a f t e r  d e d u c t i o n  o f  r e - l o c a t i o n  
c o s t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  w i l l  be  assumed t o  b e  
U =  A Q - C  , 
where AQ i s  t h e  t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e  and  C t h e  t o t a l  re- 
l o c a t i o n  c o s t .  
Assuming f o r  Q a  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  dependence on c a p i t a l  K 
l a b o r  1, human c a p i t a l  H I  w e  w i l l  have  
where l a b o r  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  v e c t o r  i ndexed  by s k i l l  and r e g i o n .  
In  a  shor t - run  pe r spec t ive  we may assume c o n s t a n t  c a p i t a l .  
Therefore  we g e t ,  up t o  f i r s t  o rde r  approximation 
L e t t i n g  
be t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  wage f o r  s k i l l  j i n  reg ion  s ,  we have a l s o  
The i n c r e a s e  i n  human c a p i t a l  can be neasured by t h e  in -  
c r ease  i n  p o t e n t i a l  wage r a t e s ,  i . e .  
AH = C ( w  -w j  s j s  i r )  Xir i j r s  
Assuming c o n s t a n t  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of human c a p i t a l  
we o b t a i n  
j s A Q  = C [ (B+a)wjs-awir]xir . 
i j r s  
The c o s t  term C i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  func t ion  is  t h e  sum of 
movement and r e t r a i n i n g  c o s t s  
C = C ( c r S + t .  xJS  = c [ B W ~ ~  + a(W -W 11 l r  j s j s  i r ) '  Xir  i j r s  i j r s  
where c and t i j  a r e  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  u n i t  c o s t s  t o  move from 
rs 
r t o  s and t o  r e t r a i n  from i t o  j .  
In  compact v e c t o r  n o t a t i o n ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t a k e s  on 
t h e  l i n e a r  form 
where all cost components have been arranged in the vector 
Remark 1. 
-------- 
This notation requires the components of vector - y and - x
to be arranged in the same order. To avoid ambiguity we will 
agree that component xl; occupies position * 
in vector x (and similarly for y )  . 
- - 
On these premises it is possible to formulate the opti- 
mization problem 
T 
max y x 
- - 
2 
where A is an NMx(NM) matrix with the following structure 
[induced by (7)l 
L 
and B an NM x (NM) matrix 
B 4 [IIIJ....~II ; I % (NM)X(NM) identity matrix, 
D = {Dirl ; v =  - {v. ) f 
1s 
* 
This is a standard way to store multidimensional arrays into a 
one dimensional vector. 
and component D occupies position ir 
in vector - D (and likewise for - V with r and i replaced by s and j). 
Remark 2 .  
-------- 
A 
This is a Linear Programming Problem. As matrix C = [-I E 
is unimodular and x, g are integer-valued, any basic solution 
is integer. 
* 
The solution - x of problem (8) - ( 1 0 )  yields the optimal 
assignment of unemployed workers to vacancies. 
Remark 3. 
-------- 
Once the solution has been obtained in terms of the vector 
* 
x , it is possible to recover the individual components xJS by 
- ir 
inverting mapping (7) according to : 
1  1  K K j = R[-I + M 6 ( R L M I )  with K 1  = Q [ N ]  + 1 - 6 ( R L i j ] )  , M 
K 2  K2 1 K1  r = R[-] + N ~ ( R [ - 1 )  with K 2  = QLFI + 1  - ~ ( R [ F I )  , 
N N 
K 3  K3 K2 K2 i = R[-] + ~ 1 6 ( R [ ~ ] )  with K3 = Q [ ~ ]  + 1  - 6 ( ~ [ ~ ] )  , M 
where 
Q  [ ] denotes integral part, 
R [ = ]  denotes remainder, 
6  ( ) is the Kronecker function. 
4. SHADOW PRICES OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
In this section we will attempt to assign a "market value" 
to inefficient allocation of labor. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that a different 
distribution of work places and unemployed people results in a 
different value of the utility function. 
Inefficient allocations in the labor market yield a sub- 
optimal value of the utility function. Therefore it is reason- 
able to define "inefficiency" of the labor market as the 
difference between the current and the optimal value of the . 
utility function. However we have been unable so far to dis- 
aggregate inefficiency by its most significative components. 
We will distinguish two major factors contributing to it: 
1) unproductiveness of a potential employee who has 
not been able to gain employment, on the supply 
side; 
2) for a given production level, higher (lower) re- 
location-retraining cost resulting from inappro- 
priate (appropriate) vacancy assignment, on the 
demand side. 
A formal definition of these concepts is now required. Let 
be the contribution to inefficiency due to one unemployed Ylr 
in region r and skill i; and y (2) the contribution due to one is 
vacancy in region s and skill 5 .  While it is reasonable to 
assume yir - (2) > 0 no restriction will be posed on the sign of yis . 
In this framework ~t is meaningless to consider the case in which 
a component of the re-allocation cost y exceeds the value of the 
corresponding component of the labor market inefficiency. There- 
fore the following constraint results: 
o r ,  i n  m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n  
I n e f f i c i e n c y  w i l l  b e  minimal when t h e  t o t a l  
i s  minimized on t h e  set  ( 1  1 ) . 
A s  it might  have been e x p e c t e d ,  problem ( 1 1 ) , ( 12) i s  t h e  
d u a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  problem ( 8 ) - ( 1 0 ) .  S i n c e  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  
t h e  p r i m a l  problem i s  bounded, t h e  s o l u t i o n  of  t h i s  problem w i l l  
* 
be bounded. The o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n  - y o f  problem ( 1 1 ) - ( 1 2 )  y i e l d s  
t h e  shadow p r i c e s  o f  unemployment and v a c a n c i e s :  
* can  be  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  shadow c o s t  o f  one Y i r  
unemployed i n  r e g i o n  r and s k i l l  i ;  
* ( 2 )  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  shadow p r i c e  of  one Y i s  
- 
vacancy i n  r e g i o n  s and s k i l l  j .  
The s o l u t i o n  of  t h e  d u a l  problem p e r m i t s  t o  d i s a g g r e g a t e  
t h e  c o s t  v e c t o r  y i n t o  a  p a r t  {yir 
- 
( ) 1 a s s o c i a t e d  t o  unemployment 
( s u p p l y  s i d e )  and a  p a r t  {y ( 2 )  } a s s o c i a t e d  t o  v a c a n c i e s  (demand j s 
s i d e )  . 
Fur thermore ,  t h i s  a l l o w s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  f o u r - f o l d  c a t e g o r i -  
z a t i o n  o f  l a b o r  market  i n e f f i c i e n c y  by means of  t h e  compara t ive  
i n d i c e s  : 
a v e r a g e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  l a b o r  marke t  i n  r e g i o n  r ,  measured 
on t h e  supp ly  s i d e ;  
ave rage  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  l a b o r  market  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s k i l l  i ,  
measured on t h e  supp ly  s i d e ;  
average i n e f f i c i e n c y  of l a b o r  market i n  r eg ion  r ,  measured on 
t h e  demand s i d e ;  
average i n e f f i c i e n c y  of  l a b o r  market wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  s k i l l  i ,  
measured on t h e  demand s i d e .  
5. OPTIMAL WORK-PLACE LOCATION POLICY AND T R A I N I N G  SCHEMES 
Assume t h a t  t he  r e a l l o c a t i o n  of l a b o r  f o r c e  has  been completed 
according t o  scheme ( 8 ) - ( 1 0 ) .  It i s  obvious t h a t ,  i n  each r eg ion ,  
t h e r e  w i l l  remain a  number of  unemployed 
I f  a  number W of new work-places were made a v a i l a b l e  a t  some 
subsequent t ime how should a  p o l i c y  maker d i s t r i b u t e  them over 
s k i l l  and space t o  minimize i n e f f i c i e n c y ?  Reta in ing  t h e  assump- 
t i o n  of  excess  l a b o r  supply ,  we w i l l  t a k e  
The unknown work-place d i s t r i b u t i o n  Wir w i l l  have t o  s a t i s f y  
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
The o p t i m a l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  we sugges t  w i l l  aga in  be based on 
e f f i c i e n c y .  Using t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  measure in t roduced  i n  s e c t i o n  
4 ,  we d e f i n e  an o b j e c t i v e  func t ion  
Minimizing t h i s  index i s  equ iva l en t  t o  us ing  t h e  newly 
c r e a t e d  work-places Wir t o  reduce a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  l abo r  
market i n e f f i c i e n c y .  
On t h e  supply s i d e  an op t imal  t r a i n i n g  scheme under excess  
l a b o r  supply can do no b e t t e r  than promoting educa t iona l  o u t p u t s  
i n  accordance wi th  t h e  s k i l l  ranking induced by t h e  * yir ( ' 1  coef-  
f i c i e n t s ,  i . e .  i n  each r eg ion  r ,  e f f o r t s  should be d i r e c t e d  t o  
re-conver t  t r a i n i n g  i n  s k i l l  i t o  t r a i n i n g  i n  s k i l l  j  whenever 
* ( 1 )  > * ( 1 )  
Yir Y j r  
6 .  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED EXTENSIONS 
The a n a l y s i s  we c a r r i e d  o u t  has  been based on an e s s e n t i a l l y  
s t a t i c  approach. Our main concern was t o  p rov ide  a  computat ional  
t o o l  t o  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a  on r e g i o n a l  unemployment and a s s i s t  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  maker i n  dev i s ing  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  This  j u s t i f i e s  
t h e  assumptions of  exogenous c o s t s  and wage l e v e l s .  Within t h e  
framework o f  our  d e f i n i t i o n s  and b a s i c  assumptions,  t h r e e  conclu- 
s i o n s  can be  drawn: 
1 .  t h e  no t ion  of  l a b o r  market i n e f f i c i e n c y  can be 
given a  q u a n t i a t i v e  b a s i s ;  
2 .  i n e f f i c i e n c y  can  be decomposed i n t o  a  supply 
and a  demand component; 
3. r e g i o n a l  and occupa t iona l  i n d i c e s  can be def ined  
t o  draw t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  map of a  r e g i o n a l  market 
system. 
I n  a  paper t h a t  w i l l  s h o r t l y  appear ,  t h e  method w i l l  be 
app l i ed  t o  ana lyze  d a t a  of an I t a l i a n  reg ion .  I n  a  long-run 
pe r spec t ive ,  a  more comprehensive a n a l y s i s  should be warranted.  
A s  some au tho r s  ( s e e  f o r  i n s t a n c e  [ 1 3 ] )  have po in ted  o u t ,  it 
i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  meaningful  r e s u l t s  c o u l d  be o b t a i n e d  o u t s i d e  
a  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  framework. To o u r  knowledge such  an 
approach h a s  never  been a t t e m p t e d  on a  r e g i o n a l  s c a l e .  Aside 
from t h e  problem o f  a  s u f f i c i e n t  d a t a - s e t  t o  t e s t  a  dynamical  
t h e o r y  of  unemployment, some of  t h e  assumpt ions  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
[ 1 3 ]  (see f o r  i n s t a n c e  t h e  market  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  a s sumpt ion)  
would have  t o  be  d i s c u s s e d  i n  a  r e g i o n a l  c o n t e x t .  The i n t r o -  
d u c t i o n  o f  s p a c e  i n t o  e x i s t i n g  t h e o r i e s  o f  unemployment may 
n o t  b e  a  t r i v i a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h o s e  t h e o r i e s .  
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